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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
VIRGIL S. REDMOND,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
10,610

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Comes now the Defendant-Appellant, Virgil S. Redmond, and petitions the above entitled Court for an order
permitting a rehearing of Point VII contained in his
original Appellant's Brief filed herein for the reason that
the Court erroniously concluded that he failed to request
that names of additional witnesses be endorsed on the
information or that he be furnished with their names.
(See last paragraph of Court's Opinion).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Criminal prosecution for allegedly uttering a fictitious
check.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant was found guilty by a jury and sentenced
to a term in the Utah State Prison.
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DISPOSITION IN SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction in an opinion Filed August 15, 1967.
RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS PETITION
Defendant-Appellant, Virgil S. Redmond, seeks an
order permitting a rehearing of Point VII contained in
his Appellants Brief filed herein, and for a new trial
after argument of said rehearing.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of the case are fully explained in the Appellant's Brief filed herein and it is unnecessary to repeat
those facts here, except to the extent that facts are recited and emphasized in the argument.
POINT I
THIS COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO REQUEST THE DISTRICT
COURT TO REQUIRE THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY TO
ENDORSE ADDITIONAL NAMES ON THE INFORMATION.
Defendant incorporates by reference Point VII of
Appellant's Brief filed herein at pages 20 through 25,
and the statement of facts found on page 4 of that brief
pertaining to the failure of the prosecution to furnish
names of witnesses who were not endorsed on the information and his objection to said additional witnesses
being permitted to testify at the trial.
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Some additional citations from the record may be of
assistance to the Court in understanding the efforts made
by Defendant to obtain the names of witnesses to be
called by the prosecution at the time of trial, and the
unfairness suffered by him at his trial as a result of being
denied the names of those witnesses until they were actually called at the trial.
Forty-six ( 46) days before trial Defendant applied to
the Court for an order limiting the prosecution witnesses
to those listed on the information, or in the alternative
requiring the prosecution to furnish the names of additional witnesses to be called by the prosecution at the
trial. The District Attorney, Jay Banks, agreed to furnish
the names of additional witnesses but failed to do so. The
motion made by counsel for Defendant and the agreement by the District attorney are found at page 607 of
the record as follows:

"MR. BARKER: Your Honor, may we have an order
limiting the witnesses to the ... ones listed on the
information or in the alternative, requiring them to
give us the names of all additional witnesses at this
time."
"MR. BANKS: We will be glad to supply additional
witnesses on the Bill of Particulars or as they become known to the State. These were the only ones
that testified at the Preliminary Hearing. Right now
I have no personal knowledge of any additional witnesses but we will supply them as they become
known." (italics supplied)
The information lists the following four persons as
witnesses:
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1.
2.
3.
4.

Clara Francis
Denyon Fineschreiber
Carroll Syphys
Jack E. Holstrom

No additional names were ever endorsed upon the information and no additional names were ever furnished to
Defendant or his counsel. The following fifteen persons
were called as witnesses at the trial by the prosecution:
(R. 163-165)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Thomas D. Stoker
Mary Halliday
Laurene F. Shaw
Kurt Madsen
Charles J. Shepherd
Karl Gustaveson
Kenneth Lee McPhail
Bert Wells
George J. Bonebrake
Fred Denman, Jr.
Gary Milo Jenkins
Dave Nicholson
Georgia Rytting
Guy Redmond
N. D. Hayward

Counsel for Defendant Redmond objected to the prosecution calling of any witnesses not listed on the information as follows (R. 355-356):
"MR. BARKER: Thank you. I object to the calling
of any witnesses whose names were not included on
the Information or not furnished to the defense on
the ground and for the reason that at the time of the
arrainment in this matter request was made to the
Court for the names or requiring prosecution to
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furnish names of any other witnesses who were not
included on the Information and that as I recall the
Court ordered and the agreement for Mr. Winder at
arraignment was, the names were to be furnished
not later than ten days before the trial. No names
have been furnished and there are certain witnesses
to which I have been alluded to before the Court and
when we approached the bench whose names have
not been furnished. I object to them now being
called as a denial of our right to be confronted by the
witnesses against us in sufficient time to interview
those witnesses and be prepared to meet their testimony and I believe Mr. Winder agrees with that."
"MR. WINDER: I don't recall ever making that
agreement and ever being ordered to furnish you
the names of the witnesses."

"THE COURT: The motion is denied."
Mr. Winder did not recall having made the agreement
to furnish the names of witnesses or the motion referred
to because Mr. Banks handled the motion and made the
agreement as indicated on page 3 above, but the
damage to and unfairness to the Defendant is just as
real whether the failure to supply names of additional
witnesses was intentional or the result of lack of communication between the District Attorney and his
deputies.
When the prosecution attempted to call witnesses
whose names had not been endorsed on the information
Defendant's counsel objected as follows (R. 376):
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"MR. BARKER: Your Honor, may we have a continuing objection to the witnesses not listed on the
Information as I previously indicated."
"THE COURT: You may."
Counsel for Defendant repeatedly objected to the calling of witnesses whose names were not endorsed or the
information or furnished to Defendant by the prosecution as the District Attorney had expressly agreed to do
(See page 3 of this brief). (R. 358; 401; 402; 430;
463; 469. The numerous objections made by counsel for
Defendant certainly advised the Court of Defendant's
position and gave the Court ample opportunity to change
its ruling and to correct its error.
Counsel for Defandant also moved for a continuance
to prepare to meet the surprise witnesses in accordance
with 77-21-52, UCA, 1953 follows (R. 401-402):

"MR. BARKER: Your Honor, in order to make a
record of the matter we discussed when we approached the bench, I move the Court for an order
prohibiting this witnesses from testifying ... My
objection is based upon several grounds. Number
one, his name is not listed on the Information as one
of the witnesses. We have not been provided with
his name until now and have had no opportunity to
prepare to meet this testimony. It takes us by unfair
surprise. My motion is to continue the matter to give
us an opportunity to do so because of this unfair
surprise ...
"We have been prevented from obtaining this witness and other witnesses and interviewing them
prior to the hearing so we could obtain evidence to
counter this . . . "
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"THE COURT: The objection is overruled. The
Court concedes that the issue of discovery is a matter
of great concern to the defendants and should a conviction result, would be certainly a good cause to
consider the matter on appeal ... The record does

not disclose any motion for a Bill of Particulars and
hence the objection to his testifying is denied and
the claim of surprise is denied ... "
It is obvious from the foregoing that in making that
ruling the Court did not recall the agreement to furnish
names of witnesses made at the motion prior to trial by
Mr. Banks, yet that agreement was most certainly made
in open Court by the District Attorney (R. 607 Page 3 of this brief) and was relied upon by Defendant in preparing for trial. Defendant had no opportunity to prepare to meet the testimony of 15 of the 19
witnesses called by the State. Defendant relied upon
the representation by Mr. Banks that the names of witnesses would be furnished and when none were in fact
furnished expected to be confronted with only the four
witnesses listed on the information. This made the preparation of a defense impossible under the circumstances
and resulted in a denial to Defendant of a fair trial and
a denial of Due Process.

The reasons why a Defendant is entitled to know the
names of prospective witnesses for the prosecution well
in advance of the trial are discussed in the cases cited
at pages 21 through 25 of Appellants Brief and will not
be repeated here.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's Counsel applied for an order requiring
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the names of witnesses for the prosecution to be endorsed
on the information or furnished to Defendant's counsel.
No order was made because of the agreement in open
court (R. 607) by the District Attorney to furnish names
of witnesses as they became known to him. No names
were furnished except the four that were originally
listed on the information. Defendant was met at the trial
with fifteen (15) witnesses whose names were not listed
on the information and were not furnished to Defendant
until each witness as in turn called to testify. Defendant
moved for a continuance to give him an opportunity to
prepare to meet the testimony of those witnesses (R. 401402) and repeatedly objected to persons whose names
were not endorsed or furnished testifying at the trial.
The Court obviously did not recall Mr. Bank's agreement
to furnish those names and Mr. Winder who tried the
case for the State of Utah was not present when Mr.
Banks made that agreement so the Court concluded that
no such agreement had been made and denied Defendant's motions and objections. Mr. Redmond relied upon
that agreement and had no opportunity to prepare to
defend against the other 15 witnesses whose names were
not furnished to him. The right to confront one's accusers
is effectively denied for all practical purposes if the Defendant and his counsel do not know the identity of those
accusers until they are called to the witness stand to
testify.
It appears that this Court erred in arriving the conclusions reached by it on the last page of its decision to
the effect that Defendant failed to object and/or to request the names of additional witnesses. Defendant re-
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spectfully urges the Court to reconsider point VII of his
original brief filed herein in the light of the additional
information and citations contained herein which show
that Defendant did in fact request those names and object to the testimony of witnesses whose names had not
been furnished or endorsed on the Information.
Done this 31st day of August, 1967.

RONALD C. BARKER
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for DefendantAppellant and Petitioner,
Virgil S. Redmond

